The Mali Situation

In July 2012, Islamic militants hijacked a Tuareg separatist rebellion in northern Mali that was spurred by the political power vacuum created when the Malian military staged a coup in Mali’s capital, Bamako, in March 2012.  Since July, the Islamic militants have exercised control over the northern half of Mali, enforcing strict Islamic fundamentalist law and preaching a jihad, or “holy war,” against the Malian government.  The entire country of Mali was declared off limits to Americans by the US State Department after the coup and the northern section of Burkina Faso that borders Mali, or “Sahel” region, was declared a no-travel zone.

Confused yet?  So was I when I first began acquainting myself with the conflict of Burkina’s neighbor to the North.  Civil conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa are rarely a simple affair, often involving antagonistic ethnic and religious groups, a military that, in practice, cannot be controlled by elected officials, and outside actors with a variety of economic and strategic interests providing money and weapons to both sides of the conflict.  Such is the case with Mali.

 The Malian military staged a coup in March 2012, sending the country into political chaos.  The northern region of Mali has always been beyond the reach of true political control, with multiple ethnic/religious groups that resent the government in Bamako.  The coup provided a perfect opportunity for one of these ethnic groups, the Tuaregs, to begin a separatist rebellion.  To their surprise, it was extremely easy to defeat poorly trained Malian army troops with questionable allegiances to the first non-existent, then new, government in Bamako.

 They pushed further south, taking control of the economic and culturally significant city, Timbuktu.  However the Tuaregs soon found that the rebellion was growing larger than they could handle, as Islamic extremists among their ranks increasingly identified the rebellion as a jihad, recruiting thousands of fundamentalists to their cause.  After jumping on the rebellion bandwagon, the extremists found the goals of the Tuareg rebellion to be unsatisfactory and promptly “hijacked” the rebellion, running the Tuareg leaders out of their ranks.

As with most international organizations, the 15 country Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), of which Mali is a member, was slow to respond to the situation. In November 2012, they finally met and, judging the rebellion to be a threat to economic and political stability in the region, approved a military intervention operation with member states contributing soldiers to begin in November 2013.

 Soon afterwards, a rare moment of agreement between France, the US, Great Britain, Russia, and China in the UN Security council led to the approval of a military intervention force working within the same time table as ECOWAS, although it would primarily be focused on training the Malian army to handle the rebellion themselves.  In early January, both of these interventions were expedited as the Islamic militants surprised the international community by pushing even further south into Mali, coming within 50 km of Mopti.

So which developed nation intervened to fight the Islamic militants with ties to Al Qaeda?  Was it the nation that spearheaded the “War on Terror” and often fancies itself the sole protector of freedom and democracy in the world at large?  Nope.  It was France.  Who? What? Why?

As with most foreign policy decisions, it may be impossible to determine the exact factors that led to French intervention, but we can assert that France has numerous political and economic interests in the region: its former colonial kingdom.  Instability breeds instability, and the countries surrounding Mali are not exactly the most politically stable nations of the world.  The Islamic militants were also shown to have strong ties with Al Qaeda, an organization that has clearly posed a terrorist threat to the US and Europe for decades.  Finally, the decision was influenced by the fact that the Malian military has revealed itself to be extremely poorly trained.  In short, the Malian military is not capable of stopping the rebellion on its own.

French military intervention consisted of air strikes on rebel bases in northern Mali and around 3,000 ground troops.  They have been successful in pushing the Islamic militants back from Mopti and further north, but the sustainability of this strategy, as it has been led almost entirely by French forces, is obviously questionable.

The militants decided to test French resolve by assaulting a remote natural gas plant in the southern region of Algeria this past week.  They took 40-50 foreign nationals as hostages and demanded that the French remove their troops from Mali.  The French refused, and the Algerian military took back the gas plant several days later, but not without the deaths of around 35 foreign nationals.

So how does the Mali situation affect Burkina Faso?  As you can see from the map, Burkina Faso shares nearly its entire northern border with Mali.  Burkina is also contributing troops to the ECOWAS coalition force, which is scheduled to join the war effort in Mali soon.  It’s worth noting that the Islamic militants claimed to have terrorist “sleeper cells” in the capitals of all contributing ECOWAS nations.

However, Burkina Faso consistently ranks as one of the poorest and most underdeveloped countries in the world.  The country contains a minimal amount of valuable natural resources and therefore enjoys a comparatively small amount of foreign investment from Europe or the US.  Among Burkina’s chief exports are cotton and sugar, both products that are clearly not among the chief economic interests of the developed world.  Not to mention that Burkina Faso’s tourist industry is virtually non-existent.

Hmmm…. well what makes Burkina Faso a target for an invasion or terrorist attack by Islamic militants?  I’m glad you asked!  Virtually nothing.  Let’s explore five potential goals of the Malian militants.  

1.       If the goal of Malian militants is to take control of valuable economic assets, they would find infinitely more agriculture products than natural resources in Burkina.  

2.       If the goal of Malian militants is to stop French military by threatening their economic interests in the region, they would certainly look elsewhere. 

3.       If the goal of Malian militants is to orchestrate terrorist attacks that harm foreign nationals in Africa, they would find a low concentration of Americans and Europeans in their neighbor to the south.

4.        If the goal of the Malian militants is widen the scope of the rebellion and recruit more fundamentalists, they will not find many jihadists in Burkina Faso.   Although Burkina has a large Muslim population, Islamic fundamentalism is extremely rare

5.       If the goal of the Malian militants is to convince Burkina Faso and other ECOWAS nations to withdraw their troops from the war efforts, they would most certainly not…….actually this is a legitimate threat  to foreign nationals in Burkina 

As far as the United States is concerned, the Islamic militants are terrorists exhibiting similar behavior to the Taliban of Afghanistan.  However, considering how things turned out when the US “liberated” the people of Afghanistan from the Taliban, the administration is clearly hesitant to directly intervene, which would only increase anti-American sentiment among the extremists and threaten US interests in the region.  Therefore, without a direct attack on American interests within the region or outside the region, the US is unlikely to commit ground troops. Besides, France has already taken the lead on neutralizing the Islamic militants, likely with encouragement from the US and possible closed door concessions.

The terrorist attack on the remote gas plant in Algeria is certainly horrific and worrisome, but it highlights the fact that Burkina Faso possesses very few things of value that are close to the Malian border, and therefore is less likely to be the target of a terrorist attack.  The United States also has virtually no economic or human presence in Burkina Faso (besides embassy officials, USAID employees, and….well….Peace Corps Volunteers), making the country less likely to be a target of anti-American terrorism.

In my personal, hardly expert, getting-information-from-the-internet-and-short-wave-radio-once-a-week opinion, Peace Corps Volunteers are safe in Burkina Faso.  Hell, we might be even safer than those damn kids in the US with their cars and booze and rock’n’roll music.

*Please be aware that I have provided a brief explanation of a complex situation.  All of my statements regarding the motivations behind foreign policy and security decisions are conjecture based on the facts that I have available. If you’re interested in all of the details, there are a wide variety of articles on the subject that present the facts in a far more systematic manner than this blog post.